On Sept. 6, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the 45-nation body that regulates the sale of nuclear fuel and technology, adopted a landmark decision authorizing cooperation with India on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This India-specific decision largely completes a politically charged, often controversial process kicked in more than three years ago by India and the United States. Largely, because the U.S. Congress still has to approve the bilateral 123 Agreement for civil nuclear commerce between India and the United States. However, all the international aspects of this understanding--a plan to separate India's military and civil nuclear facilities, an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard designated civilian facilities and now an exemption to NSG rules that govern global nuclear commerce--are in place. India has also negotiated bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France and Russia that theoretically can be operationalized right away. Nonetheless, out of deference to the United States, which has done most of the heavy lifting on this issue, India is expected to wait out the congressional process although the possible disadvantaging of U.S. companies is likely to encourage approval.
This is a path-breaking deal because India opted out of the NPT regime and has developed and tested nuclear weapons. Consequently, India, along with Israel and Pakistan, has been barred from civil nuclear commerce with the rest of the world. This has rankled India more than its counterparts because Israel does not have a nuclear power program and because Pakistan offers a stark contrast to India regarding its proliferation record. Within India, the deal is seen as breaking the mold because India has opposed the NPT regime in principle, opting instead for a national commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Its critics believe that the reciprocal commitments India has entered into as part of the understanding, reiterated by India's Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee Sept. 5 to convince NSG hold-outs of its merits, bring it closer to the regime that it has always opposed, thereby compromising its strategic independence, politically as well as technically. The issue of nuclear testing, which threatened to unravel both the Indian government and the deal in its final stages, is emblematic of this opposition. The controversy in India is not about whether India needs to test but about its right to test, something that other nuclear weapon states such as China and the United States have still not foregone.
In the final stages, opposition to the decision was concentrated in a small group of countries peripheral to nuclear commerce: Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, Norway, and the Netherlands. The group was backed by China, which played a relatively cautious and indirect role in view of bilateral considerations vis-à-vis India and because of its backing for a similar deal with Pakistan for which there is no traction in the NSG. Given recent proliferation history it is ironic that the mantle of protectors of the non-proliferation regime fell on this group,
Following the NSG decision, a European diplomat is said to have remarked, "NPT Rest in Peace," and several non-proliferation academics termed it a non-proliferation disaster. What they miss is that the NSG was originally set up also to provide a forum for bringing non-NPT signatory states into a broader framework of nuclear control. The exemption does not wreck the NSG. It simply removes discrimination against India dating back to 1992 while maintaining the group's original focus on denial of nuclear materials and technology for weapons purposes. In that sense the decision is not a big deal. To paraphrase Mark Twain, news of the demise of the non-proliferation regime is somewhat premature.
In fact, the decision strengthens non-proliferation by bringing India, one-sixth of humanity, into the tent. It acknowledges that real progress on reducing nuclear danger cannot be made without partnerships across the divide within and outside the NPT. Debates at UN forums on disarmament confirm the assessment of a seamless real world of national security and arms control behind the façade of a stolid regime and its outliers.
India's responsible record, restrained nuclear posture, advanced nuclear technological base and a strong political commitment to nuclear disarmament, enables it to bring much to the table. This decision is not going to lead down a narrow road of nuclear reactors going in one direction and dollars in the other. It is also not going to be a panacea for India's energy security problems and the world's environment and nuclear security challenges. It could have a positive impact on energy and environmental choices in a large, rapidly expanding economy. If harnessed wisely, it could also improve prospects for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Lastly, but not insignificantly, the decision demonstrates how a seemingly intractable problem can be resolved when the soft, grounded energy of India combines with the forceful, can-do energy of the United States. Such creative partnerships, especially between developed and developing countries, are precisely what the world needs today. We no longer have the luxury of received wisdom and fixed frames of reference.
Amandeep Gill is a visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.
Submitted by Amandeep Gill on September 12, 2008 - 2:52pm